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Why study social conflict in the end of 1960s?
There were external and internal reasons. In the USA, the growth of the civil rights
movement over racial discrimination, and then the anti-war movement against the Vietnam
War, were mobilizations that many university students, including myself, took part in.
What were the main criticisms you made of « big » theories of stratification? (Marx,
Weber, Parsons, Dahrendorf, …) Can we say that you did an interpretation of Weber,
Bleft wing^?
Here the internal field of sociology was making one of its periodic realignments. In
the 1930s, 40s, and 50s, Parsons raised the level of sophistication by arguing that
Durkheim formulated the central question, what holds society together, and showed
that it could not be done by isolated individuals with purely selfish andmaterial interests.
Parsons combined Durkheim’s pre-contractual solidarity with Weber’s value-
orientations of the world religions to make sociology into a theory of society at all
levels, from the socialization of the individual (which in the 1950s Parsons was
explaining by the socializing effects of the Freudian superego) up to the trajectories of
world history. This was an impressive synthesis but other sociologists were showing its
flaws. Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills (among others) showed that Weber also said
much about conflict and domination; Herbert Blumer protested against omitting the
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interpretations made by the actor in the situation; Berger and Luckmann publicized the
social construction of reality, and Garfinkel showed with novel research methods how it
is done. Marxism came into US sociology largely with the radical student movement,
but it was mediated by sociologists like Dahrendorf, who shiftedMarxism from its focus
on the working class to a focus on howmiddle-class and bureaucratic workers could also
be mobilized. This was an intellectually exciting period. Like some others, I concluded
that a Bleft-Weberian^ position could combine the strengths of Weber and Marx, give
greater understanding of organizations, cultural-identity groups, and movements, and
that Durkheim’s insights could be brought in via the micro-sociology of Goffman.
In this direction, can I say that you did a Phenomenology of Conflict? (Social Conflict
understood as Self constructed subjective worlds; others controlling subjective experi-
ences; others control who oppose them).
There was some influence from phenomenology, probably from reading Sartre in my
student years. But where Sartre could say, hell is other people, my interpretation is much
closer to Goffman and Durkheim: the self is always collectively constructed. Conflict is
largely between groups and from individuals constructed as identities when groups
focus attention upon them as distinct individuals.
What do you think about this proposition? In the end, we speak not so much of
structuring conflicts, we speak more about domination, power, symbolic violence… of
some on the others, material, symbolic and all this is a little bit static, very close of
structural-functionalism, or sociology of social stratification even if we have some
extensions of Social Conflict theory in other social fields like sex, age, family domi-
nance?What about the positive role of negative but structuring (permanent?) conflicts as
in the industrial world the structuring conflict between working class and elites for the
control of social, cultural, values, objectives?
What are the sources of social conflict? Anything can become an object of conflict if
groups or persons focus upon it from conflicting perspectives. That means, to focus upon
something in a way that it becomes the target of trajectories of action that are at cross-
purposes with each other. It is easiest to see this if we examine historically some social
institutions that at one time were not objects of conflict, but become conflictual in another
time. An example is conflict inside the family household. In medieval feudal-patrimonial
households, there was very little conflict between masters and servants, or between parents
and children, husbands and wives, because the main trajectories of conflict were between
households as the main unit of political and economic organization; outside a household an
individual had no chance of pursuing a life-course.When the bureaucratic state displaced the
household as the unit of power, and registered individuals as subjects of career-trajectories in
institutions of education, health, public service, work etc., the household became an arena in
which individual-level conflicts could take place. The main principle is that the conditions
that mobilize purposeful action also make possible conflicts. Some old sources of conflict
have disappeared (most people in the modern bureaucratic world could not engage in tribal
conflict even if they wanted to), while new sources of conflict are being developed because
of new ways of mobilizing (e.g. conflicts between different groups of sports fans or music
fans). The future will no doubt invent forms of conflict that we have not yet imagined.
Is there not a danger to consider only a Bwinners losers, Bwin lost^, Bwin win^
perspectives? To lock, to reduce social conflict theory as a crisis management theory or
peace building theory? Is there not a danger to speak only about the strategic, war
conflicts, armed groups, military groups? Napoleonic’ Model?
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I agree; many conflicts—i.e. trajectories of action at cross-purposes—do not have
winners and losers, because the conflict is a stalemate, or because the conflict loses
intensity or aborts. Even conflicts which have an ostensibly clear goal—e.g. winning a
war—often have outcomes that were not imagined when the conflict began. One has
only to think of the unexpected outcomes of most of the wars from the First World War
onwards to the recent Iraq wars, or the Syrian civil war, to see that concepts of winners
and losers are too simple for social reality.
My reason for analyzing the dynamics of wars is not to make wars the
archetype of all conflicts, but more the opposite reason: to show that even in
military violence, social organization and emotional domination are more im-
portant than physical violence. Even war, which seemingly aim at winning via
physical destruction of the opponent, actually depends in its outcomes on
breaking down enemy organization and its emotional solidarity. The dynamics
of violent conflict are more closely related to the dynamics of emotional focus
in interaction rituals, than to material resources.
And in this perspective, what about a conflict as a social relationship without
winners, without losers, without end, issues, analyzed only as a space, field of
relations with in the same time autonomy of the actors but in the same time
interdependence (Elias, concept of configuration or concept of antagonism in
Simmel’s theory)?
This seems to me to go too far, and to make conflict dissolve into a purely abstract
conceptual scheme. It is not clear that all fields of social action are equally structured by
conflict. Some fields take their major lines of structuring and of action-trajectories from
conflict: these conflict-structured fields include politics, and the intellectual world.
Politics, because the most dramatically mobilizing issues are where there is a strong
antagonism, if not with an external enemy, then with an internal opponent; thus to make
a career as a politician is to seek out conflicts that make one prominent; a politician
without issues to dispute over would never become well-known. The intellectual world,
too, generates creative ideas, and thus famous thinkers, when a new generation breaks
away from the ideas of the older generation, and also when they split among themselves
into rival schools of thought. As I analyzed in The Sociology of Philosophies, famous
creativity happens when networks reorganize themselves to fill out the small number of
rival positions available in the intellectual attention space.
On the other hand, there are some fields that do not seem to be intrinsically
organized by conflict. The realm of economic production and distribution is one of
these. It is true that capitalism is a particular economic form that is organized around
conflict; but non-capitalist economies have existed in the past, and probably will exist
in the future. The specific forms of conflict among rival monopolists and financiers, or
between employers and workers, are not intrinsic to economic relations, unlike politics,
which could not really exist if there were no conflict.
Radical Micro Interactions, Time Dynamics and Role of Neutrals, Allies
or Peace Makers
Why did you make an Binteractionist turn^ in your Social Theory Conflict? Later, how
evolved your interactionist perspective?
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I always had an interest in micro-interaction, having been trained in psychology, and
then studying with Blumer and Goffman, and working among the California ethno-
methodologists. I shifted my emphasis largely because of the pragmatics of the
sociological field; there was less interest in my work on geopolitics and developments
on Weber, than in my micro-sociology. The research field also developed a new
concern for emotions, which must be studied in micro-interactions; emotions are much
better way to conceptualize abstract concepts like norms and values, because we can
directly observe emotions in people’s faces, movements, voices, and bodies. Thus the
part of the social world that formerly was considered to be non-rational, or trans-
rational, non-instrumental, etc. can now be studied in a very concrete way. Theorists
like Parsons, or Pareto, or for that matter Elias and Foucault, talked about cultural-
dispositional factors that change historically but seem to operate from overhead; but
now the methods of micro-sociology make it possible to look at emotions as they
actually take place in specific kinds of social interactions. Locating norms, values,
predispositions, habitus and other such conceptions in the actual processes of interac-
tion among persons enables us to see the dynamics that produce, sustain, and change
such emotional-evaluative-motivational experiences. The theory of Interaction Rituals
puts the key causal conditions and outcomes into a model that predicts what people will
feel, think, say, and do in specific situations of their chain of social interactions.
Why (I can make a mistake) this form of radicalization of your theory, towards a
paradigm of extremely micro analysis, thus it does not bridge well with other
approaches?
Several reasons. Micro-sociology has become a very creative research front. Like
other sociologists, I take advantage of the new techniques of research introduced by
Goffman, by the followers of Garfinkel, by ethnographers of everyday life, by new
technologies of highly portable photography and videos. What one observes from these
techniques is what happens in specific situations; they are techniques of micro-
sociological research. Add to this an argument which I have modified from Blumer
and Garfinkel: everything that happens in the social world happens in micro-situations.
Everything else that sociologists talk about—structures, Bsocieties,^ social classes,
ethnic groups—all exist as particular kinds and patterns of micro-interaction. All data
is gathered in micro-situations, and then is transformed into something more abstract.
This means that the key to what happens must be in the micro-situations, because
nothing else exists except more micro-situations. But such an argument is not very
convincing in the abstract, unless one can show that we learn something new from
examining the features of micro-interactions. The ethnomethologists were not very
successful in making explanations that actually told us something new about states,
organizations, social movements, etc. But we learn something new from micro-
sociological research on conflict.
E-Escalation/Polarization Process
More recently, in your ASA dissertation on C-Escalation/D-Escalation, you talked
about dynamics. How describe the process, the time-dynamics?
Time-dynamics is an attempt to theorize social processes as they occur in time. Most
theorizing about causality is comparative statics. Even when some mathematical models
enter variables in a sequence, we are still theorizing in a realm of abstraction, not the real
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world of events in which things happen and we participate in them. Events take a certain
amount of time; they have qualities like sudden, slow, accelerating, static, fading or
abruptly ending. Time-dynamics are what gives events their emotional qualities: surpris-
ing, shocking, exciting, normal, boring, tedious. And probably vice versa: the emotional
dynamics of human interaction are what make the patterns of events in time.
This is a field that we are only now beginning to study. A simple question: how long
do events last? When the 9/11/2001 attack took place, I realized here was an opportu-
nity to examine the time-dynamics of Simmel’s theory that external conflict brings
internal solidarity. Americans began to manifest their solidarity by putting up flags on
houses and cars; I began to count the flags in various places, repeatedly for over a year.
This symbolic solidarity display went up very rapidly, reaching its peak within 2 weeks;
then it stayed at its height for 3 months. During this time there were many ceremonial
events, full of emotion; also a very strong pressure to national conformity, and also
events of political hysteria such as fear of poison attacks. After 3 months the opposition
began to reappear, and by 6 months the level of flag display had fallen to about half its
peak, with a long slow decline for the rest of the year. Examining historical cases of
sudden onsets of national conflict, I have suggested that there is a 3 month solidarity-
and-hysteria zone, during which most atrocities take place (this was the case during the
Spanish Civil War, for instance); then normal political splits begin to re-emerge. This is
an example of time-dynamics in large-scale conflict. The emotional pressure is so
strong during the first 3 months that people cannot act except in the prevailing mode of
solidarity, however irrational and destructive it is. This was the pattern in all the
European states at the beginning of the First World War. Intelligent strategizing began
to reappear later, but the organizational momentum set in motion was hard to over-
come. That is to say, the beginning of a mass conflict relies on widespread emotional
enthusiasm, that silences any possible opposition. After the 3-to-6 month cooling down
period, the conflict can still continue but the militant faction now uses more coercive
tactics and people follow along more with stoic determination than enthusiasm. Further
time-dynamics could be developed which show when there are actual revolts against
this coercion to continue fighting; the mutinies that took place in most of the armies
during the 3rd and 4th years of the First World War may show the pattern. It is likely
that time-dynamics are produced by more complex causality as well; additional
variables can extend or shorten the basic time-patterns.
You explain the importance of Emotions, small scales conflict, talk, circulation of
rumors. So, what could make rumors became realities? What is your definition of
atrocities? What about the forward panic in this process? When does it happen?
Atrocities are events that people generally find to be outrageous, shocking to moral
sensibilities of the time. Obviously this changes historically, and the kinds of violent
displays of power that the Romans used during their campaigns would be considered
terrible atrocities today, although at the time there was little outcry against them. Since the
early twentieth century, Western sensibilities about what are considered atrocities have
grown considerably. The causes of these changes in what is regarded as atrocities have not
beenwell-analyzed sociologically, as we tend to take ourmoral sensibilities as natural; but it
seems likely that the scope of atrocity as a social categorywill grow still further in the future.
In the general theory of counter-escalation (C-escalation), atrocities are whatever the
people on each side regard as morally outrageous. Part of the polarization process is to
take whatever the opponent does as outrageous; in small-scale quarrels, it may only be
Am Soc (2018) 49:5–15 9
the things people say. In politics today, it frequently happens to accuse a political
opponent of saying something that is racist, homophobic, etc.– and thus to make a
political scandal out of their words. In un-violent political conflict, a scandal typically
indicates the social construction of a mass mobilization to combat a perceived atrocity.
Similarly in violent conflicts; here the process tends to include rumors, stories about
what the enemy has done. Often these are stereotyped stories– enemies who rape
pregnant women or kill babies; and later it generally turns out that the events are
fabricated or exaggerated. Moreover, the process works on both sides. The opposing
side, for their part, usually believes their own rumors, that their enemy has committed
atrocities (rapes, assassinations, etc.) which we shall now revenge. This is the common
pattern in communal violence between Hindus and Muslims in India, for instance.
Rumors can become realities in this counter-escalation process; initially they may be
untrue, or gross exaggerations of smaller incidents, but as c-escalation goes on, both
sides tide produce real atrocities. Thus each side morally justifies each other.
Forward panic is a particular kind of conflict pattern. Not all atrocities are the results
of forward panics, but forward panics generally produce an atrocity, since the end result
is overkill (far more violence than necessary to win the conflict) and piling on (an attack
by a large group against weak or unresisting victims). Forward panic begins with a
phase of tension between two sides; then a phase in which the tension is suddenly
released, as one side becomes weak and the other rushes forward into an attack. I have
adopted the term from the military thinker Charles Ardent du Picq, who called it Bflight
to the front^– the pattern in which soldiers under fire will sometimes run wildly, not
away from the enemy but towards him, firing wildly. It is a collective emotional process
(that I called Bhot rush^, which is what it feels like physiologically), and it is set off
when the equilibrium of two sides evenly held in the tension of conflict is transformed
into a situation of one-sided emotional domination.
Role of Neutrals/Third Parties/Allies during the Conflict in the Polarization
Process, E-Escalation
How can we describe the process when third parties, neutrals (unlookers in a riot, a
fight) become allies? How can we evaluate, understand, measure the degree of enthu-
siasm or reluctance or whether when they remain neutral?
Empirically, in photos of a riot, the violence is carried out by a number of small
groups of about 6 persons, who find an isolated enemy to attack. Most of the crowd
stands back at a safe distance and observes. Many of them are making noise, supporting
those who fight. They are allies in that sense, emotional allies, although they are doing
nothing actively to help the fighters. When the enemy advances, this part of the crowd
is the first to run away. Also some part of the crowd is more genuinely neutral; they
come only out of curiosity, to see what is happening. Thus we can measure their degree
of enthusiasm, reluctance, or neutrality by their behavior, their positions in the space of
conflict (literally), their body postures, sounds and emotions.
What is the role of neutrals, third parties, allies in this process of keeping a
confrontation from escalating? Is the size of the group mobilized important in the time
dynamics of conflict?
A crowd can keep a conflict from escalating as long as the crowd is quite large
compared to the size of the groups that are fighting. When there is a large crowd in a
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public place, and a fight breaks out between two individuals, how long and severe the
fight will be depends on what the crowd does. If the crowd pays no attention, or is
uneasy and avoids the fight, the fight stops. If the crowd cheers the fighters, they will
have a longer fight (this typically happens when the crowd is waiting for an entertain-
ment event to begin). But if a fight breaks out when there are 6 or more persons in the
fight (especially if there are 6 or more on one side), the larger crowd has no effect on
stopping them; the fighting crowd itself is big enough to act as its own crowd support.
The process in all these variations is a Durkheimian one: the collective action of the
group when it focuses its attention generates an emotional field, either for or against
violence; and the effect of the crowd upon small numbers of individuals is
overpowering.
Can you explain me this very interesting proposition? BYou can keep a confrontation
from escalating by keeping it at the level of stalled repetition until it deescalates, quite
literally, from boredom^.
Here we are discussing individuals in conflict. Such confrontations begin
with staring at each other’s face (as Americans say, Bgetting in your face^),
arguing, making insults and gestures. There is the danger that the conflict will
escalate into touches, pushes, and then violence. However, such confrontations
often end without violence. This happens when the participants stay on the
same level, mirroring each other’s moves. In such arguments, people repeat the
same phrase over and over again– it is useless to try to state a complex
argument, and since both are talking at the same time, it is really a contest
over getting the next conversational turn; a conflict on the paralinguistic level
of speech acts, not in the contents of the speech itself. But this becomes
tedious. After a period of time– usually less than 60 s– the participants lose
their energy, their voices become lower; and finally one or the other will end
the confrontation with a gesture of disgust. Thus, some practical advice: if you
are an individual in a conflict, you can bring it to an end successfully by
maintaining close equilibrium with your opponent, but not escalating the level
of threat, until it de-escalates from boredom. This works well on the level of
individual and small group conflicts. It is not clear that it works at the level of
political and organizational conflicts, or conflicts between states.
Role of Neutrals during the Conflict in the D-Escalation Process
Why neutrals reappeared at the end, in d-escalation? What are the best positions for the
third parties, neutrals, to negotiate steps that will eventually bring disengagement?
Neutrals, despised at the beginning for their lack of solidarity, lack of courage, now
with all the atrocities, culpability of leaders, violent actors, they are playing a central
role?
The reappearance of neutrals comes from the time-dynamics of conflict, which is an
emotional process. At the beginning, conflict groups generate Durkheimian solidarity
and enthusiasm for the conflict; but over time, this enthusiasm begins to wane.
Especially if the conflict remains in equilibrium, no one is winning, then the emotional
level declines. This makes it possible for neutrals to reappear. At the beginning, the
Durkheimian collectivity despises neutrals, since they are palpably immoral persons
who do not join their righteous cause. But over time, with emotional equilibrium and
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material attrition, some of the adherents of the conflict lose their enthusiasm for
continuing. In small conflicts and in social movements that depend on voluntary
participation, the conflict can decline at this time merely because people stop coming
out to the rallies and places of confrontation. In bigger, more organized conflicts, there
is an bureaucratic machinery that is in motion (as in a war) that will carry on even
without enthusiasm, so there needs to be more active processes to stop the conflict:
neutrals who can now make connections to negotiate with the enemy; and also,
internally, a movement for peace.
At the end, is D-escalation a new sort of conflict? With new actors? In the D-
escalation process, why does peace faction vs. victory faction depend on tactics more
than ideology? Why do hardliners and compromisers not easily fit into ideological
categories, but in the latter phase of a prolonged conflict? How do compromisers
prevail?
The emergence of a movement that wants to de-escalate is the result of time-
dynamics. The collectivity that was once enthusiastic to fight their external enemy
now loses enthusiasm, but some persons lose it more rapidly than others. This creates a
new arena of conflict, now internal, over the question of whether to fight on to victory,
or to bring the conflict to an end. As an American, I have witnessed and been part of
these kinds of processes several times, with the Vietnam war peace movement, and in
the Gulf wars and Afghanistan wars. The peace movement was never as popular in the
public attention space as the patriotic faction (the victory faction), but in each case its
policy prevailed in the end. A theoretical lesson for sociology is that we need to
concentrate on a longer time-scale.
The patriotic faction has the stronger symbols – BWhat counts as losses for the de-
escalators are turned into symbols of our unstoppable drive towards victory^– i.e. they
can use the dead and wounded, or the destroyed towns and monuments if the war is
happening on your own land, as martyrs and memorials of our hatred for the enemy and
the righteousness of our cause. The patriotic cause dominates the public ceremonies
and thus the public definition of the situation. But the peace movement has the stronger
weapon, the emotional dynamics of the people at large. Not that everyone has the same
emotion; some are strong supporters of peace, who go to rallies and have their own
solidarity and try to generate their own symbols (although no peace symbols have ever
been as strong as national symbols and religious symbols). Other are simply tired of the
war; and some, who were at one time happy to be in patriotic crowds, no longer find
that exciting and turn their attention to something else. The peace movement benefits
from people who are bored, apathetic, or just busy with other parts of their lives.
The peace movement is thus not an ideological coalition. True, it has some ideo-
logical factions in it, but they are not the majority, and not what makes the peace
movement strong. It wins because it represents the emotional dynamics of a large and
growing number of people. It is so to speak an anti-ideological faction, since it is the
clear, vehement ideologies that generate the strongest conflict, hence the martyrs, and
the willingness to go on fighting no matter the cost.
What are the social origins, identities of de-escalators, negotiators? What does it
means? BThey are, so to speak, latent possibilities in the structure of conflict space over
time^.
I haven’t researched the social origins of de-escalators as compared to the victory-
activists, since my research has concentrated on the process of conflict itself. There is
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some data from peace researchers, but more is needed. My suggestion, however, is that
social origins, a static condition, is not enough to explain how the number of de-
escalators grows over time. That is the meaning of the phrase "latent possibilities in the
structure of conflict space"– it is always possible, in a conflict, to take one side or the
other, but also to be opposed to entering the conflict at all; and that gives rise to another
emergent possibility, opposing the peace movement. During the First World War
attacks on those who did not want to continue to fight were quite vicious; they were
called traitors, and sometime executed or imprisoned. From the time of the Vietnam
War onwards, the factions became publically recognized and institutionalized as
Bhawks vs. doves^. This is historically a good sign in the increasing legitimacy of a
peace movement. On the other hand, there are some parts of the world where being
neutral or in favor of peace is considered an act worthy of death. This is how the
revolutionary movement in Syria turned into a vicious civil war that destroyed the life-
chances of much of the population, especially those who did not want to fight. How to
deal with such situations is the big challenge, for the theory and practice of peace.
Policing
In your book Violence, you speak about the role of police’ organizations in the riots,
mass demonstrations, crowds and more generally in confrontational dynamics and
sometimes forward panics. What could be the role of police’ organizations as neutrals,
third parties in these conflicts’ dynamics? What kind of relations, interactions can we
observe between police forces and hardliners or compromisers?
In most demonstrations, the police (and crowd control forces) make up one side, the
demonstrators the other side. Usually the target of the demonstrators has only a
symbolic presence, or at most a material presence in the form of buildings that might
be attacked. It is rare to have two active demonstrations– demonstrators and counter-
demonstrators– who threaten each other; in such cases the police would be a third party,
who should act to keep the peace, by keeping the two factions separate. One reason this
configuration is so rare is because virtually all violent conflicts, at the moment when
they are violent, are two-sided. Even if there are multiple factions, at the time they try to
fight each other, they fall into two factions; above the number of two, the additional
factions either attacking the same target as someone else, or stay out of the fight
entirely.
This two-sided character of violence comes from the basic pattern of confrontational
tension/fear. The confrontation itself generates tension; in order to get past this emo-
tional barrier, the situation must turn into a disequilibrium in which one side feels much
less tension than the other, so it can attack a weaker victim; or it must get the emotional
support of the crowd as a Durkheimian collectivity. And even into the period of
violence itself, participants find the situation a psychological blur, with perceptual
and time-distortions, tunnel vision, a sense of confusion, a dream-state of emotional
rush. I suggest this is the reason why a three-sided conflict is impossible; it is just too
confusing. A two-sided structure simplifies the field enough so that fighters can act
coherently– that is to say, as coherently as they do, because under these emotional
conditions they do not control their violence very precisely.
The police also act this way when there are two opposing factions that they must
control. Much of the time, they will join with one of the factions and attack the other;
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i.e. they will attack only one of the factions. The demonstrators who get attacked see
this as favoritism on the part of the police, but it is also a result of the psychological
near-impossibility of carrying out a three-sided conflict. There is another way this could
be handled, which we see mainly where there are very small fights (a few fighters who
both get arrested by the police), or where the third-party authority is much more
powerful (the teacher who intervenes in the classroom by punishing all the children,
no matter who is responsible for the fight). This takes a three-sided situation and turns it
into a two-sided situation by fiat.
Can police be trained to handle such situations more carefully? Leaving aside the
situation of policing a confrontation of demonstrators vs. counter-demonstrators, I
would suggest that the main problem is for the police to avoid escalating the situation
into a conflict between themselves and the demonstrators. Anne Nassauer (Freie
Universitat Berlin) has carried out comparative research on when demonstrations stay
peaceful, and when they result in violence, via pathways starting either from the police
or from the demonstrators. There are a number of organizational patterns and micro-
tactics that make an important difference. Police training could incorporate more of
such sociology.
Future of Social Conflict Theory: A Digital Turn?
Can we consider that Internet and Social Medias are new confrontational spaces at
distance? Virtual, numerical spaces that accelerate the diffusion of atrocities, narratives,
rumors, for example?
This is an empirical question and we will find out more about it. As such
electronic media have been used so far, they continue to fit the theoretical pattern
that face-to-face conflict is difficult because it generates confrontational tension;
and violence happens when emotional dominance is displaces emotional equilib-
rium in the confrontation. Digital media can be used in the non-confrontational
phase, when the opponents are at a distance. In fact, such opponents rarely
communicate with each other; each communicates with their own side, and with
the unmobilized people in their network who they would like to bring in as
allies. This could be analyzed with the C-Escalation/D-Escalation model of time-
dynamics. Digital media are good for spreading narratives and images; especially
since these media tend to simplify as much as possible, they aid the polarization
process. And since the digital media have no centralized control, there is no
quality control over accuracy; these media are prime bases for spreading rumors.
Even photo images can act as rumors, since they can be sent without attending to
the surrounding context, and without giving accurate information about the
identities of the persons represented. Thus we can expect that digital media
mobilize social networks to engage in more conflict.
On the other hand, these media have such diverse connections that they cannot
generate a single, common focus of attention. They are prone to multiple definitions of
reality, and tend to disperse attention to many different directions. We can make this
into a researchable question: when do digital media generate a stronger collective focus
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of attention (more people circulating the same messages), and when are they more
scattered? The answer, from situations like mobilization in Cairo and Tehran, appears to
be that physical action on the ground is what generates more common attention. The
media can mobilize little groups of friends and acquaintances to go out to a place to
demonstrate or fight, and the events there create focus of attention. There is some
evidence, during the Green movement in Iran, that many people stayed home to watch,
so that the media inhibited participation, when there was publicity about the opponents’
repressive violence. So far it appears that digital media operate above all in the
mobilizing phase and not in the conflict itself.
Are Computational Studies, Digital Studies able to analyze and understand the
complexity of these new Virtual interactions? Social Conflict theory was a good theory
for hierarchical systems but what about digital, complex, connexionist societies?
There has been a certain amount of enthusiastic propaganda about the digital age and
how it is transforming society. In reality, it has been adding onto existing structures of
society but not supplanting them, or even changing them very much. A powerful social
conflict is when social groups organize to generate one big Durkheimian collective
consciousness, full of resounding emotions; and this is best done where there is a big
central place where people gather and the conflict with the enemy takes place– the
historic central places of Paris, Petersburg, Tahrir Square, etc. The media can help
publicize this but it does not eliminate the need to physically gather for the confron-
tation. Do the digital media change, if not the basic pattern of conflict, at least change
its time-dynamics? Do the percentage of persons who are networked electronically in
various ways (broadcast, point-to-point, etc) make the mobilization phase more rapid?
Do they make the 3-month solidarity-and-hysteria zone shorter, or spread it out longer?
Is the de-escalation phase more likely or less likely to happen sooner when there are
many or few people digitally connected? Do digital connections facilitate the growth of
a peace movement, or mainly just of a polarized hardline movement? These are
researchable questions and sociologists will soon find out.
We have hardly touched on the real new danger of the cyber-connected world. That is
conflict that occurs in the digital networks themselves. Cyber-war would be attacking or
destroying the network. Some of this already happens, with government attacks on
servers, and hackers’ attacks on organizations, usually denial-of-service through overload
attacks. More serious attacks could disrupt financial transfers, or electricity, or transpor-
tation control, and thus could have material consequences as devastating as bombs. The
message of sociological theory of conflict here is more pessimistic. It is face-to-face
conflict that is emotionally difficult to carry out; and these difficulties result in local
stalemates, and in larger peace settlements. But attacks over cyber networks are emotion-
ally easy; there is no confrontational tension, since the attacker never sees the victim,
indeed does not even have to think the victims are real persons. The most important
possibility, on the theoretical level, is not that digital media will transform existing kinds of
human conflicts, but that cyberwar becomes an easy form of destruction.
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